Unconditional security of coherent-state quantum key distribution with strong phase-reference pulse

We prove the unconditional security of a quantum key distribution protocol in which bit values are encoded in the phase of a weak coherent-state pulse relative to a strong reference pulse. In contrast to implementations in which a weak pulse is used as a substitute for a single-photon source, the achievable key rate is found to decrease only linearly with the transmission of the channel.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figure

Unconditional security at a low cost

By simulating four quantum key distribution (QKD) experiments and analyzing one decoy-state QKD experiment, we compare two data post-processing schemes based on security against individual attack by L\"{u}tkenhaus, and unconditional security analysis by Gottesman-Lo-L\"{u}tkenhaus-Preskill. Our results show that these two schemes yield close performances. Since the Holy Grail of QKD is its unconditional security, we conclude that one is better off considering unconditional security, rather than restricting to individual attacks.Comment: Accepted by International Conference on Quantum Foundation and Technology: Frontier and Future 2006 (ICQFT'06

Device-independent bounds for Hardy's experiment

In this Letter we compute an analogue of Tsirelson's bound for Hardy's test of nonlocality, that is, the maximum violation of locality constraints allowed by the quantum formalism, irrespective of the dimension of the system. The value is found to be the same as the one achievable already with two-qubit systems, and we show that only a very specific class of states can lead to such maximal value, thus highlighting Hardy's test as a device-independent self-test protocol for such states. By considering realistic constraints in Hardy's test, we also compute device-independent upper bounds on this violation and show that these bounds are saturated by two-qubit systems, thus showing that there is no advantage in using higher-dimensional systems in experimental implementations of such test.Comment: 4 pages, 2 figure

Generalized self-testing and the security of the 6-state protocol

Self-tested quantum information processing provides a means for doing useful information processing with untrusted quantum apparatus. Previous work was limited to performing computations and protocols in real Hilbert spaces, which is not a serious obstacle if one is only interested in final measurement statistics being correct (for example, getting the correct factors of a large number after running Shor's factoring algorithm). This limitation was shown by McKague et al. to be fundamental, since there is no way to experimentally distinguish any quantum experiment from a special simulation using states and operators with only real coefficients. In this paper, we show that one can still do a meaningful self-test of quantum apparatus with complex amplitudes. In particular, we define a family of simulations of quantum experiments, based on complex conjugation, with two interesting properties. First, we are able to define a self-test which may be passed only by states and operators that are equivalent to simulations within the family. This extends work of Mayers and Yao and Magniez et al. in self-testing of quantum apparatus, and includes a complex measurement. Second, any of the simulations in the family may be used to implement a secure 6-state QKD protocol, which was previously not known to be implementable in a self-tested framework.Comment: To appear in proceedings of TQC 201

Coin Tossing is Strictly Weaker Than Bit Commitment

We define cryptographic assumptions applicable to two mistrustful parties who each control two or more separate secure sites between which special relativity guarantees a time lapse in communication. We show that, under these assumptions, unconditionally secure coin tossing can be carried out by exchanges of classical information. We show also, following Mayers, Lo and Chau, that unconditionally secure bit commitment cannot be carried out by finitely many exchanges of classical or quantum information. Finally we show that, under standard cryptographic assumptions, coin tossing is strictly weaker than bit commitment. That is, no secure classical or quantum bit commitment protocol can be built from a finite number of invocations of a secure coin tossing black box together with finitely many additional information exchanges.Comment: Final version; to appear in Phys. Rev. Let

Heralded qubit amplifiers for practical device-independent quantum key distribution

Device-independent quantum key distribution does not need a precise quantum mechanical model of employed devices to guarantee security. Despite of its beauty, it is still a very challenging experimental task. We compare a recent proposal by Gisin et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 105, 070501 (2010)] to close the detection loophole problem with that of a simpler quantum relay based on entanglement swapping with linear optics. Our full-mode analysis for both schemes confirms that, in contrast to recent beliefs, the second scheme can indeed provide a positive key rate which is even considerably higher than that of the first alternative. The resulting key rates and required detection efficiencies of approx. 95% for both schemes, however, strongly depend on the underlying security proof.Comment: 5 pages, 3 figure

Three-intensity decoy state method for device independent quantum key distribution with basis dependent errors

We study the measurement device independent quantum key distribution (MDIQKD) in practice with limited resource, when there are only 3 different states in implementing the decoy-state method and when there are basis dependent coding errors. We present general formulas for the decoy-state method for two-pulse sources with 3 different states, which can be applied to the recently proposed MDIQKD with imperfect single-photon source such as the coherent states or the heralded states from the parametric down conversion. We point out that the existing result for secure QKD with source coding errors does not always hold. We find that very accurate source coding is not necessary. In particular, we loosen the precision of existing result by several magnitude orders for secure QKD.Comment: Published version with Eq.(17) corrected. We emphasize that our major result (Eq.16) for the decoy-state part can be applied to generate a key rate very close to the ideal case of using infinite different coherent states, as was numerically demonstrated in Ref.[21]. Published in PRA, 2013, Ja

Unconditionally secure key distillation from multi-photons

In this paper, we prove that the unconditionally secure key can be surprisingly extracted from {\it multi}-photon emission part in the photon polarization-based QKD. One example is shown by explicitly proving that one can indeed generate an unconditionally secure key from Alice's two-photon emission part in ``Quantum cryptography protocols robust against photon number splitting attacks for weak laser pulses implementations'' proposed by V. Scarani {\it et al.,} in Phys. Rev. Lett. {\bf 92}, 057901 (2004), which is called SARG04. This protocol uses the same four states as in BB84 and differs only in the classical post-processing protocol. It is, thus, interesting to see how the classical post-processing of quantum key distribution might qualitatively change its security. We also show that one can generate an unconditionally secure key from the single to the four-photon part in a generalized SARG04 that uses six states. Finally, we also compare the bit error rate threshold of these protocols with the one in BB84 and the original six-state protocol assuming a depolarizing channel.Comment: The title has changed again. We considerably improved our presentation, and furthermore we proposed & analyzed a security of a modified SARG04 protocol, which uses six state

Security of differential phase shift quantum key distribution against individual attacks

We derive a proof of security for the Differential Phase Shift Quantum Key Distribution (DPSQKD) protocol under the assumption that Eve is restricted to individual attacks. The security proof is derived by bounding the average collision probability, which leads directly to a bound on Eve's mutual information on the final key. The security proof applies to realistic sources based on pulsed coherent light. We then compare individual attacks to sequential attacks and show that individual attacks are more powerful